Let me begin my speech with a quote from one of President Putin's speeches: "Let me emphasise once again: Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an integral part of our own history, our culture, our intellectual space. It is about our people, about people who are close to us, among them are not only colleagues, friends, people with whom we have served together, but also relatives, we are intertwined with them through blood and family ties. Since time immemorial, the inhabitants of the south-eastern, historic old Russian lands have called themselves Russians and Orthodox. This was the case before the 17th century, when part of these territories reunited with the Russian state, and it remained so afterwards. [...] The reckoning with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate also continues. This is not an emotional judgement; concrete decisions and documents bear witness to this. The Ukrainian rulers have cynically turned the tragedy of the church split into an instrument of state policy. The pleas of Ukrainian citizens to withdraw the laws that violate the rights of believers are ignored by the country's leadership. Moreover, the Verchovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) already has new draft laws that are directed against the clergy and the millions of believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate." (https://zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/blog/putin-rede-21.2.2022).
In recent years, the Russian president and a number of representatives of his government have spoken out several times about both the supposed unity of the Russian world and the alleged discrimination against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which was still clearly linked to the Moscow Patriarchate at the time. However, Vladimir Putin's speech to the nation, which I quoted at the beginning, was not one of the usual addresses. This time, the powerful man in the Kremlin wanted to summarise the reasons which, in his opinion, justify military intervention in Ukraine.
In his long speech, he even created a cultural-historical framework to theoretically underpin his war. But can a thoroughly questionable narrative of unity between Russians and Ukrainians and the supposed concern for religious freedom be used to justify murderous aggression? To what extent do we recognise the views and concerns of Russian Orthodoxy in Putin's words? To what extent is this church being instrumentalised by a dictator, or rather, to what extent is it allowing itself to be instrumentalised by the Kremlin?
Both Putin's speech quoted above and later developments make it clear that religion in general and the Orthodox Church in particular must not be overlooked in the overall context of the war. Although Eastern Church narratives and tensions are by no means the only key to understanding the conflict, they do contribute to a differentiated perception of the Ukrainian war drama and its background.
The religious landscape of Ukraine
Around 70 per cent of Ukrainians belong to Orthodox Christianity, which is basically practised in two churches. There is the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OKU), which is autocephalous in the language of Orthodoxy. Its head is Metropolitan Epiphanij Dumenko. This church is extremely critical of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and emphasises the independence of the Ukrainian nation. It only came into being in its current structure in 2018, after the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, the honorary head of Orthodoxy, convened a council in Kyiv to heal the long-standing schism in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and to create an independent church that unites all Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
The vast majority of the bishops and members of the OKU come from church structures that were considered schismatic until this point in time. Recognising the OKU as a legitimate, equal member of the community of Orthodox churches is proving difficult. However, there is now full communion with the churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Cyprus and Greece. Other Orthodox churches are cautious; some reject any contact.
On the other hand, there is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOK), which is also strongly represented and headed by Metropolitan Onufriy Berezovsky. Putin spoke of this church in his speech quoted above. The UOC was long regarded as an autonomous church of the Moscow Patriarchate; until May 2022, its head was a member of the Synod of the ROC. Even if the UOC relativised the extent of its dependence on the ROC, their close relationship was evident. Until the beginning of the war, the UOC strongly emphasised the spiritual unity between Russians and Ukrainians. It is still critical of the West and ecumenism and sees itself as the only legitimate expression of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. It regards the OKU as schismatic. The OKU appears to be significantly larger in terms of the number of believers. The UOK, on the other hand, has more bishops and parishes.
The relationship between the OKU and the UOK continued to be fraught with tension. Up until the start of the war, there were controversial discussions about the dilemma: church independence or a certain connection to the ROK? The arguments in favour of one option or the other more or less reflected the prevailing different ideological tendencies in the country: independent, national and perhaps pro-Western, or part of the "Russian world"? Of course, even then the discussion could become very emotional and counterproductive. Are there "unrestrained schismatics" on one side, while "agents of Russia" wanted to determine the religious landscape of Ukraine on the other? This was often the argument.
Ukrainian endeavours for an independent, i.e. autocephalous church are nothing new. These have repeatedly met with resistance from the ROC, which proclaims the unity of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians on the basis of a postulated common origin that can be traced back to the "baptism of Kievan Rus". The new autocephalous church, the OKU, has received its independent status from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. However, the ROC questions Constantinople's authority in Ukraine (and beyond), still perceives Ukraine as a separate jurisdiction and fears that an independent church could lead to the aforementioned unity of the "brother nations" being called into question.
Around six per cent of the Ukrainian population belongs to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which follows the Byzantine rite but is united with the Roman Catholic Church. The latter is more strongly represented in western Ukraine. Its head is the Grand Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk. Its history must also be seen in the overall context of questions about Ukrainian identity and its relationship with Russia.
Although the OKU, UOK and UGKK all trace their origins back to the "baptism of Kievan Rus" in the tenth century, they use different hermeneutics to interpret history. Even if the dividing factors should not be underestimated, these three churches have much in common both in their theology and in their liturgical practice. It is precisely against this background that the divisions are particularly regrettable.
The Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran and Armenian Apostolic churches as well as several free churches and other religious communities are also represented in Ukraine, although they are small in number. Particularly noteworthy in this context is the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Communities, a platform that represents the denominational and religious diversity of Ukraine and serves the exchange of the country's various religious traditions.
The churches in Ukraine and the war
When the war began, Metropolitan Epiphanij, head of the OKU, condemned the war in the strongest terms, as expected. He spoke of Russia's "cynical attack", called for sanctions against the aggressor and held the Moscow Patriarch jointly responsible as Putin's ideological supporter. He left no doubt about the OKU's full support for the Ukrainian army defending the homeland. Metropolitan Epiphaniy repeatedly visited bombed cities and places such as Butsha, where war crimes were committed. At the same time, he regularly invited bishops, priests and believers from the UOK to join the OKU. "Our doors are open," he said. The synod of the OKU passed special rules to facilitate this transfer under canon law.
The UOK, on the other hand, represented certain aspects of Vladimir Putin's narrative before the war. Many of its representatives and members emphasised the unity between Ukrainians and Russians, denounced the West, complained about the supposedly large number of neo-Nazis in the country and spoke of major discrimination against their believers. For a long time, the UOK behaved cautiously in the face of Russian aggression in recent years; just think of its stance on the annexation of Crimea. Even in the final weeks before the start of the war in Ukraine, the leadership generally kept a low profile or preferred to limit itself to general prayers for peace.
Metropolitan Onufrij, Primate of the UOK, only found clear words after Russian tanks rolled onto Ukrainian soil. Even if his statement came late, it can still be categorised as courageous. He did not want to allow Putin's instrumentalisation of the UOK to justify the war. "The war between these peoples is a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his own brother out of jealousy," he wrote on 24 February 2022. A few days later, the Synod of the UOC reinforced the statements of its Primate by expressing its support for the preservation of Ukraine's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Many clerics of the UOC have the impression that their church has not only been abandoned by Moscow, but has been truly betrayed. Some bishops stopped commemorating Patriarch Cyril in the liturgy relatively early on. Individuals, entire parishes and even monasteries switched to the OKU. In April 2022, almost four hundred Ukrainian clerics of the UOC declared in a statement that it was impossible for them to be in canonical communion with Patriarch Cyril of Moscow. They even called for Cyril to be condemned for heresy.
In the midst of war, it is difficult to assess the true dynamics of such developments. Centrifugal forces always experience resistance and threats. Only one thing is certain: the Russian bombs also hit UOK places of worship. Clergy from this church have also lost their lives in the attacks.
The UOK was and continues to be under massive pressure due to its connection to Moscow; it is therefore in search of a new narrative that is acceptable in a Ukraine under attack. On 27 May 2022, a national council of the UOK convened in an urgent procedure decided to make changes to its statute in order to make its independence from Moscow clear. And since 29 May, Metropolitan Onufrij has been acting as the head of an autocephalous church at a liturgical level. Although the UOC has consistently avoided the term "autocephaly" in its resolutions, it is de facto a self-declared autocephaly, which therefore places the UOC in a grey area of canon law.
The head of the UGKK, Grand Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, condemned the war in no uncertain terms from the very beginning. When he described the situation during a video conference not long after the war began, he could not hold back his tears: "I read that some people said I was hiding in a bunker. That makes me laugh, because we don't have a bunker," said the archbishop, adding that perhaps some politicians do have a bunker. "I only have my cathedral with a crypt." On the day of the invasion, the archbishop and his priests were looking for ways to help concretely. Some of the city's bridges were closed and many people who tried to leave the city were trapped. They found shelter in his cathedral. "We received almost 500 people with nothing in their hands," he said.
Orthodox and ecumenical voices on the war
How have Orthodox churches around the world reacted to the war? All agree that war cannot be an acceptable means of conflict resolution. All emphasise the need for prayer, especially in these dark times. Several have pledged financial or material support for the Ukrainians. However, the various Orthodox churches differ in their willingness to clearly name Russia as the aggressor. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, the churches of Alexandria, Cyprus and Greece, as well as Romania and its leaders, have done so.
The churches that are closer to Russia, such as Antioch and Serbia, were more reserved in this respect and stuck to abstract statements. Although the heads of certain churches close to Russia generally criticised the war, they never missed an opportunity to congratulate Patriarch Cyril of Moscow on various occasions, thereby demonstrating a certain closeness to him.
The Ecumenical Patriarch sent a strong signal. At the invitation of the Polish President, Andrzej Duda, and the head of the Orthodox Church of Poland, Metropolitan Sawa of Warsaw, he visited Ukrainian refugees in Poland immediately after the start of the war. It was important to him to show the solidarity of the Orthodox Church with the displaced persons and refugees. Since then, Bartholomew I has received Ukrainian delegations several times, condemned the war and strongly criticised the attitude of the ROC leadership.
In large parts of the rest of the Christian world, harsh condemnation of Russia as an aggressor by name was the norm. Although Pope Francis avoided naming specific names for diplomatic reasons, he clearly signalled his concern for and support of Ukraine.
Stunned and indignant reactions to the Russian Patriarch's stance are dominating reactions in the ecumenical world. Several important individuals and bodies have appealed to Patriarch Cyril to use his influence on Putin to end the war as quickly as possible. One of the first was the Archbishop of Munich, Cardinal Reinhard Marx, as well as the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches (WCC) until the end of 2022, Ioan Sauca, incidentally a Romanian Orthodox priest, who called on Cyril at the beginning of March 2022: "Raise your voice so that the war can be ended".
The attitude of the Russian patriarch
The initial silence and abstract prayers for peace at the beginning of the war gave rise to hopes that the Russian Patriarch Cyril would distance himself from Putin. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Even in the first months of the war, Patriarch Cyril justified Putin's actions in his Sunday sermons. On 27 February 2022, he described Russia's opponents as "forces of evil". A week later, he spoke of a "metaphysical" battle, attacked the West and its values and used unmistakably homophobic slogans.
On 13 March, the Patriarch demonstratively presented an icon of the Mother of God to one of the top generals of the Russian army. He also expressed his solidarity with the Russian armed forces on 27 March when he celebrated the liturgy in the newly built main cathedral of the Russian armed forces. This cathedral, not even three years old, visually expresses the glorifying ideologisation of Russian history and Putin's combat narrative.
Cyril paid tribute to the Russian soldiers "who dedicate their lives to the defence of the Fatherland". The Patriarch emphasised: "We are a peace-loving country and a very peace-loving, long-suffering people. We have no desire for war, but we have been brought up throughout our history to love our homeland and to be prepared to defend it as only Russians can defend their country." In April 2022, he called for support for the Russian state and added that this would contribute to "true solidarity" and defence against "internal and external enemies". This would result in "as much good, as much truth and as much love as possible".
For Patriarch Cyril, this is a cultural struggle based on the evil intentions of the West. In his opinion, the intervention of Russian forces is justified because it defends the unity of Russians and Ukrainians, which is jeopardised by forces of the "decadent" West. Although he admits that Ukrainians are also part of his church people, his prayers and praise are only for the Russian soldiers. The patriarch's thinking is paternalistic and Manichean.
In October 2022, Cyril declared that Russian soldiers who lost their lives in Ukraine were forgiven for all their sins. He compared dying "in the fulfilment of military duties" to God sacrificing his son Jesus. According to Patriarch Cyril, the Russian Orthodox Church holds the general view that people who die in the fulfilment of military duties are making a sacrifice for others. "And that is why we believe that this sacrifice washes away all the sins that a person has committed".
On the occasion of Vladimir Putin's 70th birthday, the Russian Patriarch congratulated him with the words: "Through years of tireless work in key positions of the state, you have earned the reputation of a national leader who is selflessly devoted to the Fatherland, sincerely loves it and puts all his strength, skills and talent at its disposal." God had endowed Putin with powers so that he could perform a service of special significance for the fate of the country and the people.
The displeasure in the Christian world about this attitude is clear. Prominent voices such as that of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, an expert on Russian theology, have gone so far as to raise the question of excluding the ROC from the WCC. It should be noted here that Patriarch Cyril is not to be equated with Russian Orthodoxy. There are also voices within the UOC that clearly positioned themselves against the Russian invasion and subsequently felt the consequences.
It should also be noted that there are hardly any opportunities for freedom of expression in the Russian Orthodox Church. This is shown by the example of Belarus: after the
The rigged elections of August 2020, which dictator Lukashenko supposedly won, were followed by mass demonstrations throughout the country, which were brutally suppressed. Metropolitan Pavel, head of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, who denounced these actions, was recalled, transferred to Russia and replaced by a loyal successor.
The Declaration on the Doctrine of the Russian World, the Ruskij Mir
And how is the world of Orthodox theologians reacting to Cyril and the war in Ukraine? On 13 March 2022, Orthodoxy Sunday, a "Declaration on the Doctrine of the Russian World (Ruskij Mir)" was published jointly by the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham University (USA) and the Volos Academy of Theological Studies (Greece). In an accompanying letter, the coordinators of the initiative, Dr Brandon Gallaher and Dr Pantelis Kalaitzidis, summarise the theological concerns of this declaration: The Russian World is an ideology instrumentalised to the theological underpinning of a crime; unfortunately, it is no exception in the history of Orthodox ethnophyletic ideologies.
The text reads: "The support for President Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine by many members of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate has its roots in a form of Orthodox ethnophyletic religious fundamentalism with a totalitarian character, called Russkii Mir or "the Russian World", a false doctrine that attracts many in the Orthodox Church [...].
In the speeches of President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Cyril (Gundiaev) of Moscow (Moscow Patriarchate), the "Russian World" ideology has been repeatedly invoked and developed over the last 20 years. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and started a proxy war in Ukraine's Donbas, through to the start of the full-blown war against Ukraine and beyond, Putin and Patriarch Cyril have used the "Russian World" ideology as the main justification for the invasion.
This doctrine holds that there is a transnational Russian sphere or civilisation called Holy Russia or Holy Rus'. It claims to encompass Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (and sometimes Moldova and Kazakhstan) as well as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers around the world. It assumes that this "Russian world" has a common political centre (Moscow), a common spiritual centre (Kiev as the "mother of all Rus'"), a common language (Russian), a common church (the Russian Orthodox Church, the Moscow Patriarchate) and a common patriarch (the Patriarch of Moscow), who - according to the concept of "symphonia" - co-operates with a common president/national leader (Putin) to govern this Russian world and maintain a common, distinctive spirituality, morality and culture.
Against this "Russian world" (so the doctrine goes) stands the corrupt West, led by the United States and the Western European nations, which has capitulated to "liberalism", "globalisation", "hostility towards Christians", the "rights of homosexuals" propagated in gay parades and "militant secularism"."
(https://publicorthodoxy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022.03.22-Declaration-German.pdf)
The Orthodox theologians, among others, proclaimed: "We therefore condemn and reject as unorthodox any teaching that encourages division, mistrust, hatred and violence between peoples, religions, denominations, nations or states. We further condemn as non-orthodox and reject any teaching that demonises or encourages demonisation of those whom the state or society considers "other", including foreigners, political and religious dissenters and other stigmatised social minorities. We reject any Manichean and Gnostic divisiveness that would elevate a sacred Orthodox Eastern culture and its Orthodox peoples above a debased and immoral "West". It is especially reprehensible to condemn other nations through special liturgical petitions of the Church, elevating the members of the Orthodox Church and their cultures as spiritually sanctified in a special way over the carnal, worldly "heterodox"." (ibid.)
The declaration has now been translated into more than 19 languages and signed by more than 1,500 renowned theologians. The majority of these are Orthodox, but important voices from the wider ecumenical community also support the document in solidarity, which is why this declaration initiated by Orthodox Christians is also considered a document of multilateral ecumenical significance, which has already received extraordinary attention in the international ecclesiastical and secular media.
How can reconciliation take place in Ukraine?
The Ukrainian churches are operating in a minefield. It is difficult to predict church developments. The number of church conversions from the UOK to the OKU is considerable, especially considering the extremely tense relationship between the two churches. There are attempts by certain political circles to ban the UOK altogether. The Ukrainian government no longer conceals its distrust of the UOK. However, the idea that a fairly large church such as the UOK will disappear from one day to the next, by virtue of a law or whatever historical automatism, is not plausible. Generosity, openness and flexibility with mutual respect can contribute to reconciliation. At the same time, it is clear that the UOK, which was affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate until May 2022, faces major challenges. Its pro-Russian stance before the war and the behaviour of individuals who belonged to it is being increasingly scrutinised. For many, she is still under suspicion and in need of an explanation.
There is no doubt that the Moscow Patriarchate and Russia have lost the hearts of the Ukrainian Orthodox with their attitude. The UOC is currently searching for a new narrative; its relationship with the Russian Church needs to be reorganised. Much depends on the development of the war and the clarification of the status of the UOC under canon law. Pragmatism and the spirit of Orthodox oikonomia could in any case help the churches in Ukraine to find a way to overcome the conflict. Even if the standardisation of church structures is desirable in the long term, the co-existence of parallel structures that are in eucharistic communion could be acceptable in the medium term. The toxic situation of two Orthodox churches that remain hostile within Ukrainian society, which is in need of reconciliation, will be difficult to bear after the war.
I have the faint hope that this war will bring all the churches in Ukraine, not just the Orthodox, closer together. What unites them here is not resistance to a common enemy, but unity in faith in Jesus as the powerless one who dies on the cross, rises again, heals wounds and calls us to overcome divisive differences. The unspeakable massacre must not lead to the formation of new rifts, but to the establishment of effective and vigilant structures of dialogue. We need ecumenism as a pioneer of reconciliation today more than ever, also in Ukraine.
Outlook for pan-Orthodoxy and ecumenism
It is also difficult to predict the impact that the war in Ukraine will have on the unity of Orthodoxy. It is certainly a major blow for the Russian Church. Some of the churches that have long been close to it will certainly have to redefine their stance. The war has highlighted the existence of very dubious dependency networks in Orthodoxy. Both fear and the temptation of money play an important role in shaping intra-Orthodox relations: No church wants a parallel Russian jurisdiction to emerge in its territory that would poach many of its faithful, as is currently the case in Africa. African Orthodoxy (Patriarchate of Alexandria) has paid the price for its support of Ukraine's autocephaly. Russian pilgrimage tourism is an important source of income for several churches.
Nevertheless, the Orthodox churches have their own pace and their own way of dealing with history and its challenges. Their greatest temptation remains nationalism combined with imperial fantasies. The Orthodox churches are paying the price of this ideologisation of their faith. The fatal thing is that the churches themselves allow themselves to be instrumentalised by politics. We see this problem particularly strongly in the case of Russia; however, it is not an exclusively Russian problem, it is a problem for several Orthodox churches, including the Ukrainian one.
What does this mean for ecumenical endeavours? We need dialogue; we need a willingness to talk; we need to build bridges and work towards reconciliation. We say yes to dialogue, but dialogue with whom and under what conditions? In some ecumenical bodies, many things have long been tolerated, accepted and unpleasant things swept under the carpet. To a certain extent, the Russian Church has been apologised for and considered a special case, which has not been good for Russian Orthodoxy in the long term.
Differentiation is necessary: Russians and Russian Orthodoxy are not fundamentally enemies of other Christians. However, the attitude of the dictatorial regime is dangerous and the reactions of the Russian patriarch are theologically and pastorally untenable. The fact that things were not called by their name for a long time marks an ecumenical and Eastern Church failure. Why were the Ukrainians ignored to such an extent that not a single church from Ukraine will be a member of the WCC in 2022?
Why have the Ukrainian autocephaly efforts and the corresponding actions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate been criticised so often, especially in Germany, in an extremely one-sided manner? How many church leaders from the Western world have had contact with Metropolitan Epiphanij in recent years? Why have there always been criteria for assessing the behaviour of the OKU that have not been used to assess the attitude of other Orthodox churches, such as the issue of nationalism? For a long time, many in the ecumenical movement did not want to see or hear, so as not to jeopardise relations with the "special case".
"When the salt loses its flavour". A personal statement on the 11th WCC Assembly
Dealing with the war in Ukraine and the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards it was one of the greatest challenges for the 11th WCC Assembly (Karlsruhe, 31 August - 8 September 2022). How should the world's most important multilateral ecumenical body react to a war involving two countries with predominantly Christian populations? How to deal with the statements of the leadership of Russian Orthodoxy, which underpins this war theologically and explains it with shockingly homophobic slogans as a metaphysical struggle against the decadent West?
Ultimately, it was about the tension between prophetic and diplomatic ecumenism. Should one tell the whole truth - at the cost of the withdrawal of the delegation of a church that feels offended? Or would it be better to preserve unity - at the cost of a watered-down message? In Karlsruhe, where I attended the WCC Assembly as a delegate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, I noticed a clear preponderance of diplomacy.
Admittedly, everything could have been very bad, but in the end, the plenary session adopted a statement containing many important and courageous theses. And yet I left Karlsruhe with a strange feeling.
In his speech, Federal President Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier summarised an ecumenical challenge that was barely discussed at the Assembly: How can the leadership of a WCC member church not simply tacitly accept a war, but justify it with arguments supposedly taken from the message of the Gospel? The fundamental question is not whether the WCC is on the side of Russia or Ukraine, but how this body deals with churches whose leadership violates basic Christian principles.
Today was the theological justification of the war in Ukraine. Which red line will be crossed tomorrow? And by which church? By the way: As the representative of the OKU Roman Sigov said in plenary, a bishop who had posted a video with Ukrainian hostages a few weeks earlier was allowed to attend and vote at the plenary assembly as a member of the Russian Orthodox delegation. In his post, the metropolitan had even made fun of the hostages.
I did not advocate the exclusion of the Russian Orthodox Church from the WCC, but I would have liked to see a stronger prophetic message addressed to its leadership. The critical statements of the Federal President's speech were concealed in the corresponding press releases from the WCC and EKD. They merely mentioned that President Steinmeier had welcomed the ecumenical guests. In the Ukraine plenary session, the Orthodox confessional meeting, the Europe plenary session and the business plenaries, there was hardly any mention of Patriarch Cyril's stance. His church has felt too little headwind and has even discovered or recognised a number of friendly voices towards it.
Criticism from the Ukrainians was to be expected, but where was the rest of the ecumenical community? Public criticism would be helpful for the ROC. I had not expected much from the statement on Ukraine, which had to be adopted by consensus; and the talk in it of a rejection of the abuse of religious language and authority did not encompass the problem in its entirety. But I missed the criticism in the plenary sessions. And: The Assembly should hear that the statement has the value of statements from McDonalds and Starbucks, said a representative of the ROK in plenary.
In any case, I am of the opinion that self-confident Christian words, with prophetic strength and the intensity of honesty, are more helpful than boring, abstractly formulated texts that make everyone happy in the short term and unhappy in the end or, perhaps even worse, lead to indifference and cynicism and weaken the peacemaking potential of ecumenism. "If salt loses its flavour, how can it be made salty again?" (Matth. 5:13) The Assembly gave me and gives us reason enough to reflect on this verse.
In Greek, ecumene means the inhabited, and therefore habitable, earth. Bombs and wars do not make the earth habitable. Dialogue, working on structures of reconciliation, of listening carefully, of honest, fair debate, of inclusion: we need all this more than ever to make our world more habitable and ecumenical. I hope that the experience of this unspeakable war will help us to do some things better in the future.
