I'm sure you'll see the difference between a great scientist and a simple foreign minister after just two minutes. I will look at the issue from the perspective of a European politician and start - as I have of course listened carefully - with the points you have made, Mr Münkler.
I.
You have to imagine: If we could manage to get these five major players, the four countries USA, Russia, China and India as well as the European Union, to pull together in this world! What an opportunity the world would have in stabilising peace, but also in combating poverty and achieving climate targets, to name just a few examples. What immense potential there would be to really put the world on a better track.
What has shaped me after my 20 years in office are two dates, two events towards the end of my term of office: the first is 24 February 2022 and the second is 7 October 2023. Sometimes you dream that these events would not have happened at all, but they did. In these two decades in which I have been active as Foreign Minister and in European politics, I have learnt patience. But now, at the end of last year, I have really asked myself whether we can still hold this world together or whether it is not coming completely apart at the seams.
If international law, if the UN Charter is trampled on in this way - and not by just anyone, but by a member of the Security Council with veto power - are there still opportunities for political influence? The next question immediately follows - and I am really not a pessimist or a pessimist: But do we still have any influence anywhere in the world, first of all as a collective, as Europeans, in conjunction with the USA and together with others that we call the West? Have we not collectively failed in the last two decades so that these two events could have happened at all?
I am a European, which means I am not a fatalist and I really appreciate all the freedom we enjoy here together - including the freedom to take a critical look at ourselves and at political issues. And that is why I would like to thank the Catholic Academy for allowing me to be here and to discuss the European Union with such a great academic and with all of you, including critically.
II.
I believe that it must always be repeated, even to highly educated people, that European unification was created during the Cold War after the Second World War and that it stands on two feet: Germany and France. The idea at the time was that these two countries, which had repeatedly fought each other, would no longer do so. And the ingenious thing at the time was not just to include these two countries, but to take a more global view, to create a sextet rather than a duet: the three Benelux countries, plus Italy and then Germany and France. You know that we eventually had 28 members - well, one left us. But I don't know if he's completely happy. And it's quite possible that this state might come knocking on our door again in ten years' time to become a member again. Because the situation the British are in now is probably not something they would have dreamed of.
But Germany and France are at the centre - and you know that very well if you are from Luxembourg, because you have felt their conflicts first-hand for a long time: The fact that Germany and France are no longer fighting each other, but that they are sitting together at the same table, these two totally different cultures, languages, mentalities and, above all, egos, is not nothing. The fact that both have been given a common ambition in the European Union, namely to be democratic and peaceful in the interests of everyone in Europe, is a success story. I am well aware that the European Union is not one hundred per cent perfect. But after all, we have experienced 80 years in which there has been no war between the countries that are in the European Union. That doesn't apply to the whole of Europe. We know that these terrible wars raged in the Balkans in the 1990s.
Europe is still a major economic power, even if we have to be very careful to keep it that way - Herfried Münkler is right about that: the USA accounts for 24 per cent of the global economic volume, the European Union for 22 per cent and China for 15 per cent. However, fundamental questions will need to be answered in the coming years. The course must be set: You may have noticed that under the leadership of two Italians, Mario Dragi and Enrico Letta, major analyses are being carried out on the internal market, but especially on how the European economy can remain competitive in the world. You can try as hard as you like at national level - it is no longer possible to achieve this with national measures alone. Economic policy must also become more federal, more European. Of course, this brings us to a point where many people in Germany are immediately cringing. Namely, the decision to make and support the idea that the large funds needed for a European economic policy can, and indeed must, also be funds that can be raised through large loans. Even today, Europe still provides 50 per cent of all global development aid. That is a tremendous achievement. And as far as human rights and the rule of law are concerned, we are certainly not perfect, but we are very progressive. And we enjoy a European way of life and this European way of life deserves to be protected in the long term: in my opinion, of course, also intensively internally, but above all as a model for the outside world.
III.
The European Union only has a chance in this multipolar world if the countries stand together effectively. Take just one example: for Putin, there was no longer a European Union in the last ten years; there were only European states left and he tried to play them off against each other. With some success. In the upcoming elections for the European Parliament in June 2024, we will probably see parties on the right fringe, the extreme right fringe, who want to destroy European integration, make strong gains. Young people will be allowed to vote at the age of 16 and we must be careful that the voices against European integration and those who want to break up the European Union, as Putin wants, do not gain the upper hand.
A few weeks ago, the important French newspaper Le Monde published a major article stating that the Franco-German tandem had been shattered by the war in Ukraine. A first warning sign: President Macron's statement on 26 February 2024 that he did not rule out the possibility of EU or NATO troops being deployed in Ukraine at some point during the Ukraine war was a second act of alienation. Especially when Chancellor Scholz then replied that there would be no agreement with Germany, neither in the EU nor in NATO, to deploy European soldiers in Ukraine.
Then came the third act - on 15 March 2024: on this day, the leading politicians of the Weimar Triangle came together in Berlin: the German Chancellor, the French President and the Polish Prime Minister. They fell into each other's arms in front of the cameras, so that if Wolfgang Schäuble were still alive, he would say: "The dispute is over".
But of course it's not that simple. But you could sense that if Germany and France really go different ways, the situation will become complicated. I believe that Germany and France and most others in the European Union know very clearly that Putin must not win. There are certainly nuances and perhaps one must also understand that Germany, especially Chancellor Olaf Scholz, but also his predecessor, have always placed transatlantic relations at the centre. Unlike Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, by the way. In my opinion, he did the right thing back then when he voted against the Iraq war together with France in 2002. But Chancellor Scholz - see his statement that the Leopard 2 tanks would not be delivered until the American Abrahams tanks were also delivered - is acting in such a way that he is seeking total agreement with the USA and prefers the transatlantic alliance to cooperation with France.
In France, however, they understand, or at least sense, that Germany does not have the same strategic culture in foreign policy as they do. Germany joined NATO in 1955 and only joined the UN in 1973. France, as a nuclear power and permanent member of the UN Security Council, sees itself in a different position. The French accept that Germany is the strongest economic power in the European Union, but in the field of foreign policy, the French see themselves at the top. I believe that it is acceptable for the Germans and the French to take different paths in the European Union. After all, diversity is one of the European Union's strengths. Incidentally, the civilian use of nuclear energy is another area where the two countries are very much at odds, but that is also something we can manage.
But I must make it clear that Germany and France cannot be on two different tracks when it comes to EU foreign policy, at least when it comes to the central issues of foreign policy. There must be no disagreement either on Ukraine and Russia or on Israel and Palestine. There must be no room for multipolarity here. Because if that happens, if very different approaches are taken here, European foreign policy will no longer be recognised at all.
I would like to explain two examples in more detail. As far as Israel and Palestine are concerned, we had a common position in the EU until Brexit: Jerusalem is the capital of both states and the borders of Palestine are the 1967 borders. This was then abandoned after the Brexit vote, quite clearly by Boris Johnson, who was British Foreign Secretary at the time. And various other countries in the European Union have also abandoned this common arrangement. So now we no longer have a common position on Israel and Palestine in the European Union.
The second example - as you may remember - is the UN Pact on Migration. Some EU states were in favour, others against, others abstained. Whenever the European Union does not have a common position on fundamental and important issues - and I have always felt this in practice and also said it clearly - then we do not count on the world stage, we are laughed at. And that is why this is a crucial point, especially if we are going to operate in a multipolar world, which we have to work on.
IV.
We are confronted with a few fundamental questions that Herfried Münkler has already touched on. We need to know that they could become even clearer from November 2024. If another president is elected in the USA, one who has already been. If a deal were to be struck with Putin, an idea that Trump has repeatedly mentioned, i.e. the concept of "land for peace", the result would be that Russia would be awarded Crimea and the Donbass. The European Union would then have to deal with the rest of Ukraine. If that were to happen over the heads of Ukraine and also over the heads of the European Union, we would have to know how to react.
I think the very first thing would be that Ukraine would then have to become a member of NATO. I'm talking here about around 80 per cent of the area and population of Ukraine, which is still a large country. However, I don't know whether a consensus can be reached here. We would have to realise the danger that this would be a test, not only for Ukraine, but also for the European Union.
On a military level, Ukraine is currently in massive difficulties. The best you can hope for at the moment is that they have the strength to hold their positions. There is no longer any talk of offensives and of course I don't want to say too much about this in public. I just want to emphasise what has been our task in the EU over the last two years, which we must continue: The Ukrainians need ammunition to defend themselves. They do not need this ammunition to attack Russia. If we in Europe are not able to reliably supply what they need, then one day Ukraine will no longer exist. Ukraine cannot stop this war, it must survive it. If not, then Putin will have won across the board and he will be facing Poland.
The second big question is what happens to NATO. I'm not so sure that, even if Trump were elected, the Americans here would stand by without resistance if NATO were to be dismantled. But we need to be clear about how we deal with the nuclear issue. We have two nuclear powers in Europe, France and the UK. But let's look at the figures: The Americans have 5200 nuclear warheads, the Russians 5400, China currently 410, France around 290 and the UK at the moment 225.
Now the question is one that is also being discussed in France and was raised by President Macron in Sweden: These weapons serve as a defence against attacks on France's essential interests. In this case, the president has the power to use the nuclear weapons. But what would happen once NATO is destroyed and Putin attacks us? What can then or what will then be the response? I don't think about it every morning, but I am sure that this question will come up progressively. Perhaps it will not arise at all, we hope so, but we have to think about it.
The European Union has done a great job in the Ukraine war. You can't always say it's not enough, it was too slow. I can remember the first meetings of the foreign ministers after 24 February 2022, which was not easy. We were so confused and so agitated, thinking about whether we should supply weapons or not. As you know, there was a big debate about this in Germany. But that turned round very quickly when we saw the terrible images of war. And I believe that we acted within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 51 says that if a country is attacked, it can form a coalition with other countries to defend itself. And we, as the European Union and as NATO, are a coalition that is helping Ukraine to defend itself against these attacks by Putin. Incidentally, we also imposed sanctions fairly quickly. Whether they work or don't work - that's one thing. But as the European Union, we have shown that we not only have interests, but that we must also show solidarity when a country is attacked in this way and make the appropriate military resources available. It is totally wrong and completely irresponsible to say that the war would be over if the European Union and others stopped supplying weapons. Maybe in Ukraine, but Putin would have won across the board and then what?
It also pains me to see the discussions in Slovakia, where those who no longer want to supply weapons are in favour of peace and those who want to help Ukraine are seen as warmongers. We must hold our line: We stand by the sanctions and we must make great efforts to ensure that Ukraine is given the means to continue to defend itself. The coming weeks and months will be decisive. If Putin gets away with violence, then of course this will not be limited to Ukraine, then all doors will be open. Then the law of the strongest will prevail over the strength of the law, even on other continents.
V.
A second important issue for Europe is the Middle East conflict. There is no justification whatsoever for the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023; it was barbarism of the highest order. When operations are carried out in such a barbaric manner and hostages are taken, it is a combination of horror and terror that cannot be surpassed. But how do we get out of the conflict now? When I say "one", it is of course first and foremost Israel and Palestine, but it is also a question for the international community. You know that Israel was founded in 1948 and that the UN recognised the existence of the State of Israel on the basis of a partition of the country. Of course, Israel's right to exist is not up for discussion. However, we also need to know that this partition act was also intended to create a second state, at that time not for the Palestinians, but for the Arabs. We know the story: it did not materialise, instead there were wars, expulsion, flight and immeasurable suffering.
If we as Europeans are asked whether Palestine has the right to a state, we as the European Union must say yes. That brings us to this complicated but simple two-state solution. Personally, I even believe that Israel will not be able to rest until the Palestinians have their own state. And if we make the same mistake as the international community, which has not paid attention to this problem in recent years, which has not wanted to see it until it has exploded the way it has, then there will be no solution. I believe that the international community must hope and do everything it can to ensure that a legitimate negotiating partner comes to power on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides in order to find a two-state solution.
When I criticise Prime Minister Netanyahu, it's like when I used to criticise Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, for example. That's my right, that's everyone's right. When I criticise Prime Minister Netanyahu, I am not being anti-Semitic, because he has prevented a two-state solution with his settlement policy over the last 20 years and has never allowed it to come to fruition. When I became minister in 2004, there were 300,000 settlers living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Today there are 700,000.
And the second criticism is directed at the settlers who are using violence against the Palestinians in the West Bank, which is inhumane and must be stopped. And even our American friends are now finally saying the same thing. I hope that there will be a unified position in the European Union, that they will take the lead and come to an understanding with the Americans. What gives me hope, for example, is that in November 2023 I received the family members of various hostages in my Foreign Minister's office in Luxembourg. There, a woman from Metz, who was at the concert attacked by Hamas when the drama unfolded, told me: "When this war is over, I hope that the Israeli and Palestinian people will sit down together and seek peace."
If we're always stuck in UN procedures or arguing about commas and full stops in declarations, we won't make any progress. But things can't go on like this in this region. Israel must be able to live in security and the Palestinians in dignity. I believe that this is feasible in a multipolar world.
