Pn person, Mgr Pacelli is very pleasant. He is an open and straightforward character, a man of honour through and through, a pious priest who deserves complete trust and doesn't like any tricks. I have therefore always done best with him when I have poured him clear wine. He is receptive to personal favours, but modest at the same time. His manners are impeccable, if somewhat monastic." This is how the Royal Bavarian envoy to the Papal See, Otto Freiherr von Ritter zu Groenesteyn, characterised Eugenio Pacelli, whom King Ludwig III granted the agrément as nuncio in Munich on 19 April 1917. A person of whom, as the Bavarian diplomat prophetically wrote, "it could be assumed that he would even be found worthy of being elected pope one day if the circumstances were right." But Ritter also described this person as a "strict advocate of canon law". This quality was soon to be felt in Munich.
I.
This was because the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, Cardinal Franziskus von Bettinger, had died in mid-April 1917 at almost the same time as Pacelli's predecessor Giuseppe Aversa. Pacelli left no doubt that the new archbishop was to be appointed on the basis of the recently promulgated Codex Iuris Canonici, but for the first time encountered clear resistance from the Bavarian government on this issue. For its part, it saw no reason to discuss with the nuncio the right granted to the king in the Concordat of 1817 to appoint the archbishop.
There it says literally in Article 9: "His Holiness, in consideration of the advantages resulting from the present agreement for the affairs of the Church and religion, will confer on King Maximilian Joseph and his Catholic successors by Apostolic Letters, which are to be issued immediately after the ratification of this agreement, the indult for perpetuity to appoint worthy and suitable clergymen to the vacant archiepiscopal and episcopal sees in the Kingdom of Bavaria, who possess the qualities required for this according to the canonical statutes. His Holiness will grant them the canonical appointment according to the usual forms."
Nuncio Pacelli was told by the Chairman of the Bavarian Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Count Hertling that Munich was not considering deviating from the previous practice. Thus, Ludwig III's letter to Pope Benedict XV referred to "Nominatio" as before and not, as Pacelli had suggested, to "Postulatio". The nomination of the King of Bavaria made Michael Faulhaber Archbishop of Munich and Freising and Ludwig Sebastian Bishop of Speyer. The "Eos libere nominat Romanus Pontifex." (CIC/1917, can. 329 §2) of the new Code remained unheeded for the last time.
The nuncio had already remarked in his speech to the king on the occasion of the presentation of the letter of accreditation that the time at which Pacelli took up his post in Bavaria "was perhaps unparalleled in history". When Kurt Eisner proclaimed the Free State of Bavaria on the night of 8 November 1918 and the King and his family fled Munich in a cloak-and-dagger operation, the Concordat of 1817 could no longer be upheld. A new regulation of the relationship between state and church had become unavoidable. Kurt Eisner's revolutionary government had already demanded the abolition of clerical school supervision, while at the same time guaranteeing full freedom for religious societies and their religious practices. Eisner's assassination on 21 February 1919 and the subsequent revolutions made negotiations on the regulation of church relations unthinkable.
The Hoffmann government, which took office on 17 March, was not an ideal partner for negotiations on a concordat from the outset. Johannes Hoffmann, who had headed the Ministry of Culture under Eisner and had renamed his ministry from "Ministry for Church and School Affairs" to "Ministry for Education and Culture" - a step he would have liked to continue until it was renamed "Ministry for National Education" - was rather reserved towards church wishes. The later Bavarian Minister President Hugo Graf Lerchenfeld wrote to the Foreign Office in Berlin in December 1919: "Minister President Hoffmann is a fanatic in this area [of state-church relations] - he is also an elementary school teacher by profession: these two facts are enough to prove the danger of unwise actions." Hoffmann had in fact failed to inform the nuncio of his government's accession to office or to contact the nunciature in any other way. An omission of which not even the government of the "Jew Kurt Eisner" - as Faulhaber called him - was guilty, having informed the nuncio "in a very polite manner" of its assumption of office, as Otto von Ritter reported from Rome.
The adoption of the Weimar Constitution on 11 August 1919 added another obstacle for Bavaria. Article 78 stated: "The maintenance of relations with foreign states is the exclusive responsibility of the Reich." (RVerf. Art. 78) This provision in conjunction with Article 6 "The Reich shall have exclusive legislation on relations with foreign countries" (RVerf Art. 6, para. 1) first had to be circumvented. According to Otto von Ritter, he had never encountered any opposition in Rome when he argued that "wherever Catholics lived, [...] the Pope as head of the Catholic Church was also at home" and that "the Pope was not a 'foreign state'."
But this was only one side of the coin, so to speak; the other was that it was necessary to prove Bavaria's state sovereignty, which was essential for the Holy See, as it would hardly have been possible for it to maintain diplomatic relations in the long term if this had not been the case. Ritter, a skilful diplomat, succeeded in holding his ground with the Curia by pointing to the federal form of the imperial constitution and claiming "that the Bavarian state had therefore also retained the character of a personality under international law."
It is hardly conceivable that the Curia a) was unaware of the imperial constitution, which expressly no longer granted the constituent states the right of legation, and b) simply accepted the claims of the Bavarian envoy. Rather, this "pia fraus" - as Franz-Willing wrote - of Bavaria's state independence will also have had a fig leaf function for the Curia, to which Bavaria owed the continuation of diplomatic relations to a large extent. The fact that Munich was well aware of the existence of a pia fraus is demonstrated by a statement made by the Minister of Culture, Franz Matt, who clearly emphasised the difference in relations between the Pope and Catholics in Bavaria on the one hand and the Pope and the Free State of Bavaria on the other.
Key points that made the Concordat so valuable for Bavaria become clear here. After Prussia had agreed that its legation to the Holy See would be absorbed into the newly established Imperial Embassy, Diego von Bergen, the previous Prussian envoy, was the first German ambassador to hand over his letter of accreditation to the Pope on 30 April 1920. At the same time, the Vatican made it clear that it attached the greatest importance to maintaining both the Bavarian legation and the nunciature in Munich. This was valuable for Bavaria to know. At the same time, however, the growing importance of the Empire hovered over the Bavarian officials like a sword of Damocles. This is illustrated by the fact that on 29 June 1920, Pacelli presented his credentials to Reich President Ebert and thus headed two nunciatures in personal union, whereby he was Nuncio I in Berlin but only Nuncio II in Munich, even if he was treated "first class" in Munich. The concordat thus had central significance for Bavaria's independence as a state.
II.
Negotiations on the concordat officially began with Pacelli's note of 27 December 1919 to the Bavarian state government, in which the nuncio stated that the concordat of 1817 had been violated and at the same time communicated the Holy See's willingness to enter into negotiations with the Bavarian government on a new agreement. Even the Hoffmann government was prepared to do so and informed the nuncio of this in January 1920. When Ritter was able to transfer the Bavarian legation back to Rome in the same month, Benedict XV spoke to him in his first audience about the new regulation of state-church relations. The Pope emphasised that he wanted to build on relations with the Kingdom of Bavaria in order to avoid a vacuum. Benedict considered the school issue in particular to be of central importance for the new regulation of the mutual relationship.
When the negotiations finally began, the Bavarian side was well aware that the situation for the Curia was much better than at the time of the old Concordat of 1817 due to the imperial constitution, which meant that Bavaria was rather hesitant to start and conduct the negotiations. This was despite the fact that the moment was favourable, as Rome was very interested in good relations with Bavaria and Germany. According to Ritter, in a situation "where we otherwise have to reckon with little sympathy in the world and on the other hand the political reputation of the Papal See has generally improved since the war, it is important to cultivate and utilise this and to avoid anything that could impair the Pope's benevolent feelings for us." On the other hand, Pacelli, who hoped for a better understanding of ecclesiastical matters under the new government of Ritter von Kahr, was pushing for this. Pacelli expected quick negotiations with Catholic Bavaria and its long tradition of concordat, so that he wrote to Otto von Ritter in June 1920 that he would soon have to "leave this beautiful country [...] to take up the new, extremely difficult post in Berlin."
In February 1920, Pacelli had already presented the Bavarian government with his points for a new concordat, which from then on served as the basis for negotiations. However, the negotiations were suspended until June because Kahr did not want to tie down a successor government in the event of a change of government in the elections, which did not materialise. In Rome, they were prepared to leave Pacelli in Munich for the time being and not to send him to Berlin, which was also agreed to in Berlin, as the establishment of a nunciature in the German capital had been arranged "and because Pacelli, with his far-reaching understanding of German peculiarities and wishes and his independence vis-à-vis the Curia, could be more useful to us in Munich than a less informed and weaker successor", as the German ambassador Diego von Bergen put it.
Pacelli opposed attempts by the Empire to obtain a concordat before Bavaria. According to the nuncio, this was not in the interests of the Pope, and the Bavarian concordat could also serve as a "basis" for later negotiations with the Reich. An attitude that the Holy See should always adopt. For its part, Berlin merely wanted to check whether the treaty was compatible with the constitution before submitting the concordat to the state parliament.
At the end of the year, the Bavarian envoy was able to report from Rome that they were thinking of using the Bavarian concordat not only as a model for the Imperial Concordat but also for concordats with other countries, which is why they were urging an accelerated procedure in Rome. "In the interests of recognising the personality of the state and the importance of Bavaria in church politics, I can only welcome this," Ritter wrote to Munich.
Problems now arose from Prussia, which had renounced its legation in favour of the Imperial Embassy and saw itself at a disadvantage compared to Bavaria. Prussia did not see itself in a position to agree to an imperial concordat in which Bavaria would not be involved. Although the imperial government was aware that it could not deny the states the right to conclude a concordat, it now endeavoured to avoid a flood of state concordats. The states were asked to join a Reich Concordat, after the conclusion of which they would be free to agree "special concordats on issues that particularly affect them."
Furthermore, people in Rome were gradually becoming impatient, as Benedict also wanted to enter into negotiations with the Reich, but these were only to begin after the Munich negotiations had been concluded. In addition, the current situation in Rome was perceived as an "unpleasant provisional arrangement" and it was feared "that, despite all reservations, it could lead to uncomfortable precedents for the Church if it were still inclined to resolve the questions arising between Church and State in accordance with the previous contractual relationship [that of 1817]."
However, Prussia's endeavours to obtain its own concordat also caused unease in Munich. It was therefore "more or less a question of life and death for Bavaria whether or not it would succeed in securing its own concordat independent of the Reich in the very near future and thereby create a guarantee that it would at least retain a remnant of state personality in the cultural sphere." The change of government in Munich from Kahr to Lerchenfeld further delayed the process.
For its part, the Curia increasingly urged Bavaria to move at a faster pace. It is safe to assume that this was not done out of pure altruism towards Bavaria. On the contrary, the view was expressed relatively openly that it would be advantageous for the Church if Bavaria allowed itself to be incorporated into an imperial concordat, as this would allow issues of central importance to Rome, such as the school, to be regulated in a way that was more in line with the Curia than if it were forced to negotiate these points with the Protestant-dominated Empire, without Bavarian support, as it were.
Ritter clearly saw that "a Bavarian concordat, which would only be left to pick up the crumbs of an imperial concordat, [...] would put Bavaria in a pitiful position vis-à-vis the Holy See". At the same time, however, it must be emphasised that the Reich was far from providing the Curia with a basis for a concordat that would have been attractive enough for Rome to shelve the Bavarian concordat. In January 1922, the last replies to Pacelli's points were sent from Munich to Rome.
III.
In February 1922, the change of pontificate from Benedict XV to Pius XI dominated the Eternal City. At the first audience with the Bavarian envoy, Pius XI showed himself to be thoroughly in favour of Bavarian interests. He wanted both the concordat to be concluded and the mutual diplomatic missions to be maintained. The new Pope expressly welcomed the fact that the Minister President now wanted to take care of the Concordat's affairs himself. However, Ritter also felt compelled to urge haste, as the danger of an Imperial Concordat was increasing. He had learned "that the German ambassador was endeavouring to convince the Cardinal Secretary of State of the idea of incorporating the Bavarian Concordat into the Reich Concordat."
How difficult the situation was in the Reich with regard to a concordat, however, is shown by a note from the Vatican's advisor in the Foreign Office, Delbrück, from February 1922. The German states, especially Prussia, did not want to conclude an imperial concordat without Bavaria; moreover, Prussia was difficult to persuade to include the central school issue in a concordat. Under such conditions, the Curia would probably not have been persuaded to negotiate, especially as Pacelli's draft was already available, which, as was noted in Berlin, contained very far-reaching demands. This problem was also recognised in Bavaria, where Pacelli was determined to include the question of redemption in the concordat with Bavaria. According to the Bavarian diplomat, Pacelli's action arose from the consideration that a concordat with Bavaria on the question of the redemption would provide a better basis for negotiating this point with the empire.
Both sides now hurried, so that by May Gasparri was already talking to Ritter about the possibility of reaching a conclusion in the same month. However, tough discussions on detailed issues, such as the training of the clergy, quickly put an end to the Curia's ambitious plans. In addition, the fact that the concordat was planned as a model now became a problem. Other European states, such as Poland, were keeping a close eye on the negotiations between Munich and Rome in order to demand any concessions made to Bavaria for themselves. In addition, Delbrück had in the meantime submitted his draft for an imperial concordat to the Holy See, a circumstance that was viewed with concern in Bavaria, as the Unitarianism that Delbrück, in Ritter's opinion, represented wanted to see Bavaria incorporated into such an imperial concordat.
However, Bavaria's intransigent stance, which subsequently at least strengthened Prussia's insistence on a concordat of its own, caused the efforts for an imperial concordat to fall asleep for the time being at the end of 1922. This is remarkable insofar as it happened at a time when Delbrück's draft provided a basis for negotiation that Pacelli also considered to be "a suitable basis".
Rome also shifted its efforts back to the Bavarian side. When Ritter was received in a private audience with Pius XI in September 1922, he reported that the Pope had informed him that "the Bavarian concordat [...] would be suitable to serve as a model for a concordat to be concluded with the Reich. It could also be of use beyond the German borders." In addition, Pius had instructed Pacelli to do everything in his power to speed up the negotiations. On 27 September, Pacelli had handed over the curial replies to Matt's submissions to the Minister of Culture in Rome.
However, the Roman draft did not trigger any euphoria on the Bavarian side. The otherwise reserved diplomat Ritter wrote to Munich: "He is not, at least not apparently, in favour of 'do ut des'. That is the first impression one gets of him when one only reads about the state's obligations on the first 7 ½ pages and only learns at the very end, in barely 19 lines, what the Church is obliged to do in return."
Bavaria now tried to achieve more favourable conditions. Ritter wanted to give the Bavarian government the right to object not only to the appointment of bishops, but also to the appointment of canons and parish priests. A proposal that was in clear contradiction to the imperial constitution. While the Munich government struggled with the provisions on the sphere of influence of the imperial constitution, the priorities in Rome were different. Gasparri was concerned with implementing the provisions of the CIC and finding a satisfactory solution to the school issue for the Church.
When the negotiations had finally reached a certain pace, Count Lerchenfeld resigned in Munich and Ritter von Knilling took over the reins of government. At the beginning of 1923, Heinrich Held, who would later become Minister President, intervened to lobby the Vatican to ensure that the concordat had a chance of being passed by the Bavarian parliament. Ritter, who shared Held's views, saw major problems with regard to the increasing state benefits and the decimated rights of Bavaria. In January 1923, a counter-draft had been drawn up in Munich "on the basis of the Vatican draft, which contained the minimum of what the government believed it had to demand in order for the concordat to have a chance of gaining a majority in the state parliament."
Pacelli also recommended that Rome be extremely accommodating. The efforts were successful. In Rome, they worked flat out on the report on the Bavarian counter-proposal and the Congregation of Cardinals met on the sixth of May with results on detailed issues that helped to speed up the process. The questions regarding the appointment of bishops, the admission of theology students to universities with a school-leaving certificate not obtained at a state school and the previous training of the clergy remained unresolved. The Vatican was now clearly interested in seeing the concordat through to its finalisation undisturbed.
In addition, the already smouldering situation in the Saar Palatinate had come to a head, which is why the Cardinal Secretary of State pressed for a conclusion "in order to [...] reject attempts by France a limine" aimed at gaining influence in the diocese of Speyer. In August 1923, when the negotiations seemed to have been largely finalised, the question of the right of nomination for the (arch)bishops came to such a head that the Bavarian envoy feared that Rome would allow the concordat to fail and accept all the resulting disadvantages for the Church. This is likely to have played a significant role in Bavaria ultimately giving in.
The "Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch" took place during this phase of the negotiations. The putsch showed the negotiating partners who they would have to deal with. "I cannot deny that the nationalist and especially anti-Catholic endeavours represent a danger for our problem child in general that should not be underestimated," wrote Pacelli to Otto von Ritter a good two weeks after the coup. In Rome, it had "made a very bad impression", as von Ritter reported, that demonstrations had been organised against the Catholic clergy and Archbishop Faulhaber. It is also to the credit of the deserving diplomat Otto von Ritter that the coup events, which had not enhanced Bavaria's reputation with the Curia, had remained without major consequences.
Towards the end of 1923, it was finally possible to negotiate the modalities of ratification. The Vatican forbade negotiations on the content of the concordat after it had been signed. In January 1924, Minister of Culture Matt handed over the final text of the concordat to the nuncio. In mid-March, Reich Chancellor Marx informed the Bavarian government that the Reich government had no objections to the Concordat. On 29 March 1924, Minister President Knilling, Ministers Matt and Krausneck for Bavaria and Pacelli for the Holy See finally signed the Concordat in the Montgelas Hall of the Bavarian Foreign Ministry.
It was clear to all those responsible that not all difficulties had been overcome with the signing. Uncertainty arose when Heinrich Held was elected Prime Minister with only a slim majority after the state parliamentary elections, which was significant for the concordat in that it still had to be approved by the state parliament. The Protestant centre party now played the central role in helping the treaty achieve a breakthrough, which meant that the Protestant churches had to be offered an equivalent. A right of the Protestant churches that the Vatican did not dispute, but it was - not without good reason - scrupulous to ensure that there was a difference between the Concordat as a treaty under international law and the treaties with the two Protestant regional churches.
However, Held saw no alternative to combining the concordat with the state treaties with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Bavaria on the right bank of the Rhine and the United Protestant Evangelical Christian Church of the Palatinate in the so-called Mantelgesetz. This amalgamation and the largely identical wording were due to the political situation in the state parliament. This first had to be communicated to the Curia. Held wrote to Ritter: "I do not doubt in the least that Your Excellency's often proven, outstanding diplomatic skill will succeed in winning over the Holy See to a just appreciation of the above-mentioned considerations and to dispel the [...] sensitivities mentioned." Ritter lived up to expectations. Just two days later, the envoy was able to report to Munich that Rome understood the tactical approach of the Bavarian government.
At the beginning of 1924, Prime Minister Held presented his government statement, which he wanted to deliver to parliament with the aim of ensuring a smooth vote in the state parliament, to the nuncio. The nuncio reacted with astonishment to Held's interpretations, particularly with regard to the appointment of ecclesiastical offices and financial issues, which had been too generous for Pacelli. The Curia saw the substance of the treaty at risk and wanted to avoid later conflicts from the outset, even if they were aware of the motives in Munich.
Finally, an agreement was reached that enabled Rome to approve Held's - revised - explanations. Pacelli, who had travelled to Rome for the sake of speeding things up and had spent several hours discussing the matter with Pius XI, had played his part in this. After three days of negotiations, on the evening of 15 January 1925, the Coat Law was adopted by 73 votes to 52. The concordat was ratified nine days later.
IV.
The question of the significance of the treaty remains. The significance it had for Bavaria at the time of its creation and certainly in the years that followed is undisputed and is clearly evident from the above. It was a pledge of state independence, as the Prussian interventions prove. It also played a not insignificant role in helping to contain the constant French endeavours to gain influence in the Bavarian Palatinate, which was subject to the League of Nations. This was one of the reasons why the Holy See had been pressing for a swift conclusion all these years. Only with a treaty under international law behind it could the Curia make a solid case to France.
Looking beyond the borders of Bavaria, it can be seen that the concordat did justice to its intended role as a model, even if the illustrations of the model were milder than the original.
In addition, the treaty took on a significance that - as the sources from the National Socialist era show - was never intended. Like the Reich Concordat, it served the Holy See as diplomatic leverage against an unjust dictatorial regime.
In the time of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, the situation must be reassessed. The right to a concordat was never in question. On the contrary: in the 1950s and again in the 1960s, there was a consensus that Bavaria could not be denied the right to have its own legation at the Holy See.
Today, at a time when the Holy See is concluding concordats with German states, such as Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, whose Catholic population falls below the 4% mark, it is clear that the significance of concordats generally lies in regulating the relationship between state and church. The significance of the Bavarian Concordat at the time of its conclusion, which goes beyond this, must now be regarded as historically conditioned. Nevertheless, the first amendment to the Bavarian Concordat in 1966 - 42 years after its conclusion, it was amended for the first time due to the closure of the theological-philosophical university in Freising - proved its quality; the same applies to its unbroken continued existence to this day. It remains to be seen whether a concordat that makes such major concessions to the church in many respects, such as financial benefits, will be sustainable in an increasingly secular society. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a modus vivendi was found with the concordat that has survived all the upheavals of the 20th century and has largely proven itself in practice. Its importance is also evident from the fact that it regularly crops up in public discourse. Just think of the filling of bishop's chairs or the so-called concordat chairs, the role of the church at university and - more rarely - in schools. Despite all the discourse and dissent, the Concordat has obviously been a good framework for a fruitful relationship between state and church in Bavaria over the last 85 years. It will be interesting to see how this agreement is adapted to today's changed conditions in the future.
