The topic is very topical, but also very complex. I would therefore like to emphasise at the outset that it will not be possible for me to address and highlight all aspects.
You have also invited a lawyer, who will therefore primarily look at the questions and topics from a legal perspective. The topic can also be examined from a socio-political, sociological, religious studies or historical perspective. I would be delighted if we could then bring these into the subsequent discussion.
The following figures: The figures for the Christian churches and the Jewish population are relatively accurate and well recorded statistically, both by the organisations themselves and by government agencies. The other figures are essentially calculations and estimates based on surveys and scientific studies. However, it is not the digits after the decimal point that are important when analysing the issues. Rather, trends, developments and orders of magnitude are a sufficient basis for consideration and discussion.
Now to my actual lecture: I will first present some figures on the development of religious affiliations since 1990, then the constitutional foundations, Article 4 of the Basic Law and Article 140 of the Basic Law, and then, from my point of view, examine current and interesting individual questions.
Religious affiliation in Germany
In 1990, around 35.4 % (approx. 28 million) of citizens were Roman Catholic, 36.9 % (approx. 29 million) Protestant, 3.7 % Muslim and 22.4 % non-denominational. A brief look back and comparison with the figures from 1987 for the old Federal Republic of Germany make the changes brought about by reunification very clear: in 1987, around 42.9 % were Roman Catholic and 41.6 % Protestant, 2.7 % Muslim and 11.7 % non-denominational.
In the GDR, only just under 40 % of people were members of a Christian church, most of them Protestant. The majority, and this was also the aim of the state party SED, were non-denominational.
The unification process could have given the impression that the DRR was a state of pastors and lawyers who had also worked for the church.
The churches in the GDR had given the opposition freedom and thus also provided the structural framework, especially in the first months of the peaceful revolution. However, the churches had not necessarily always built up religious ties. This can also be seen in the years that followed with many people leaving the church. But regardless of these "GDR peculiarities", both Christian churches suffered considerable membership losses in the following 30 years.
In 2021, the figures were as follows: Roman Catholic 26 % and Protestant 24 % of the population, Muslims 4 % and non-denominational 42 %. This trend continued in 2022! Christians are now in the minority, accounting for less than 50 % of the population.
The Bertelsmann Foundation's latest Religion Monitor describes a blatant loss of importance for churches in Germany. According to the survey, it is not actually a turning away from religion, but from the churches. Around 5,000 people were surveyed in Germany and almost 90 % of church members agreed with the statement that it is possible to be a Christian without a church. Many church members are also considering leaving the church: 66 % of Catholics and 33 % of Protestants. This crisis of the church as an institution is also evident in the number of those who have lost trust in religious institutions: around 62 %!
Attempts to explain the development: In the sociology of religion, three main theories are discussed about the changing role of churches and religious communities: 1) the secularisation theory: processes of modernisation of a society go hand in hand with a marginalisation of religion. 2) The economic market model: The services offered by the large churches are not sufficient and are not tailored to the needs of the target groups. 3) the individualisation theory: Neither a loss nor an increase in importance, but the concept and practice of religiosity are in a strong process of change.
I ask for your understanding if I do not take a final position on which theory offers the better explanation. Of course, developments within the church and findings of misconduct also play a role that should not be neglected. However, one point is somewhat neglected in all approaches: demographic change. An ageing and shrinking society is facing particular challenges that are not leaving the churches and religious communities unscathed. Although we are currently a growing society again overall, this is exclusively due to immigration. This trend has not yet been broken in the autochthonous society. As a result, church congregations are becoming smaller, congregations are merging, leading to a loss of identity in the congregation and considerably more deaths in the churches than baptisms.
Development of Judaism
In 2021, we were able to celebrate a special anniversary in Germany: 1700 years of Jewish life in Germany. An edict issued by Emperor Constantine on 11 December 321 to the Jewish community in Cologne is the first documentary evidence of Jews in his domain and thus also in the area that is now part of Germany.
We all know that the history that followed was very, very chequered over the centuries. It was not until 1871 that formal legal equality was achieved in the German Reich, but this did not yet lead to comprehensive social equality. However, life was at least legally secure until 1933. In 1933, the legalisation and expulsion began, first from public life, then from Germany, culminating in extermination, the Holocaust. Immediately after the capitulation in 1945, the first Jewish communities were re-established. The Central Council of Jews, the nationwide umbrella organisation of Jewish communities in Germany, was founded in Frankfurt in 1950. In 1963, it was recognised as a corporation under public law (KöR).
Since reunification, the number of members in the municipalities has increased considerably. This was not due to reunification itself. In the GDR, only around 500 Jews were organised in 5 communities. Since 1989, around 200,000 people of Jewish faith have come to Germany from the states of the former Soviet Union, the so-called contingent refugees.
Today, the Central Council has around 100,000 members in its communities. The total number of Jewish people in Germany is estimated to be around 200,000. In 2003, the German government concluded a state treaty with the Central Council of Jews to promote Jewish life in Germany. Since 2018, €13 million has been paid out annually. In addition, other projects and organisations are also funded at federal and state level.
The Jewish community has changed as a result of immigration from the states of the Soviet Union as well as general social changes. On the one hand, Orthodox Jews have become stronger, but the Union of Progressive Jews has also become more prominent and has grown in numbers.
Islam in Germany
There have always been Muslims in Germany, but their numbers were so small that they were hardly recognised as an independent social group. This changed in the 1960s with the so-called labour recruitment agreements with Turkey, Yugoslavia, Tunisia and Morocco. Originally, the idea was to bring in labour for a certain period of time, who would then return to their home countries. However, the so-called family reunification soon began, and corresponding communities developed with everything that goes with it, including, of course, "religious care". The desire for religious care led to prayer leaders and imams being brought or sent from their home countries.
The number of Muslims increased again in the 80s and 90s. This was mainly due to refugees as a result of wars, civil wars or revolutions - the Islamic Revolution in Iran, wars in Afghanistan, the collapse of Yugoslavia, wars and civil wars in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are just a few examples.
All of this has led to today's approximate figure of 5.5 million Muslims in Germany (BAMF estimate). Of these, around 4 million are considered to be religiously affiliated. The largest religious group among Muslims are the Sunnis with approx. 74 %, followed by the Alevis with approx. 13 % and the Shiites with approx. 7 %. Muslims of Turkish descent make up the largest group of origin with around 2.5 million. These figures clearly show that Muslims in Germany form a very heterogeneous group. However, the statement by our former Federal President "Islam belongs to Germany" was and is very much justified!
The largest Sunni umbrella organisations are the Turkish-Islamic Union (DITIB, approx. 900 communities), the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (including the Islamic Community Milli Görüs, approx. 400 communities), the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIKZ, approx. 300 communities) and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD, approx. 300 communities). There are also other denominational umbrella organisations such as the Alevi Community Germany (AABF, approx. 100 communities), the Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany (IGS, approx. 140 communities) and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (AMJ).
The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute of Believers claims to represent around 70 % of Muslims living in Germany. However, according to a 2020 study, only around 16 % of all Muslims and around 23 % of Muslims of Turkish origin feel represented by the DITIB. The desire of Muslims for religious support here in Germany has led to imams and prayer leaders being brought or sent from their countries of origin and, of course, from Turkey in particular. This also offered and still offers considerable opportunities for the sending countries and the religious communities there to exert influence on the people being cared for here. This is done in particular by Turkey, but also by Saudi Arabia and Iran.
DITIB is co-financed and controlled by the Turkish religious authority Diyanet in Ankara. By its own admission, the DITIB represents Turkish state Islam with the principle of separation of state and religion. The communities are looked after by prayer leaders (hodja/imams) paid by the Turkish state.
These two factors - the lack of imams who are familiar with German society and who have been trained here, as well as the opportunities for exerting influence in other countries and thus consolidating the social structures and ideas in those countries as a result of secondment and funding - are important factors in the problems of integrating Muslims into German society.
This led to considerations of promoting an Islam that is created in, from and for Germany and thus addresses the social issues that concern Muslims in Germany. The German Islam Conference (DIK) was founded in 2006. The DIK was established in September 2006 by the then Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble. In doing so, he laid the foundation for a long-term and comprehensive national dialogue with the Muslims living in Germany and their representatives and institutions.
In the past, the DIK met and worked in fixed formats and forums. There were permanent memberships in working and steering groups linked to individuals or organisations, to which certain topics and work assignments were allocated. Fixed committees and permanent memberships were the organisational expression of the objective of achieving concrete results, definitions and recommendations in defined areas and defined work steps.
This forms the basis for the work of the current DIK, which now works in topic- and event-related, variable and flexible formats. The dialogue and events take place with different participants depending on the subject matter, the respective objectives and the stakeholders or organisations involved. Formats include specialist conferences, working discussions, political dialogue events, workshop discussions and panel discussions, whereby these events can be public or closed. The dialogue is complemented by financial support for measures to implement the goals of the DIK.
The DIK has and had a broad and diverse range of participants. Islamic umbrella and umbrella organisations, Muslim individuals as well as representatives from ministries, the federal states, local authorities, academia and practice have already been involved and integrated. However, the Muslim community in Germany is (also) undergoing change. In recent years, numerous new initiatives and associations have emerged outside the traditional mosque structures, in which young Muslims in particular have come together to influence social debates. This Muslim diversity of opinion should also be integrated within the framework of the DIK. It should reflect the necessary debate within the Muslim community about the prerequisites and foundations of an Islam that is at home in Germany and independent of foreign political influence, for example.
The DIK's work focussed on the exchange and understanding of specific topics and concerns as well as the search for solutions and rules for practical everyday issues, e.g. Islamic religious education at state schools, the teaching of Islamic theology at universities, Islamic welfare and pastoral care, the construction of mosques and the prevention of hostility towards Muslims. The results were summarised in recommendations, handouts and informational materials.
There has been repeated criticism of the composition of the DIK, both from those not represented there and from individuals and organisations represented there. The topics were also the subject of discussion. Overall, it can be said that this format facilitates the necessary socio-political dialogue with Muslims in Germany, but should of course be developed further.
This very brief description of the development of religions in Germany over the past 30 years shows very different processes. However, it clearly shows the importance that religion still has in society and for the development of society! Not only religion but also the institutions that stand for religion are very important and indispensable mediators and contacts. This importance of structures is demonstrated by the process set out in the DIK.
The past years of the pandemic and the current challenges posed by the war in Ukraine started by Russia show just how important religion is for people in times of crisis. This is also emphasised in the Bertelsmann Foundation's Religion Monitor: religion understood as a source of meaning helps people to deal with uncertainty. Religion is therefore not only a private resource, but also a source of support in times of crisis! Perhaps this is also an opportunity!
And I would also like to add one more thought: Religion and its institutions - churches and religious organisations - are and remain very important, not only for the individual, but also for society and social cohesion.
Constitutional principles
This brings me to the constitutional foundations. With a certain simplification, two central norms of the Basic Law should be mentioned here: Art. 4 GG and Art. 140 GG.
These regulations on the relationship between the state and religious communities in Germany apply equally to all religious and ideological communities. Many questions of state-church law/religious constitutional law are also regulated in treaties between the state and the religious communities. According to the Basic Law, the federal states are primarily responsible for religious affairs. This is also the reason for the majority of treaties between the federal states and churches.
Contracts with religious communities help to put relations between the state and the church on a permanent legal footing. This is an important contribution to ensuring that state and church can co-exist without conflict.
Treaties between the Catholic Church and the state are called concordats. Protestants refer to them as church treaties. It would go completely beyond the scope of this article to list or describe all concordats and other state treaties. Put simply, they regulate the following areas, among others: Protection of Sundays and public holidays, church administrative districts, recognition of dioceses, episcopal sees, cathedral chapters, parishes, procedures for the appointment of theology professors, training of religious education teachers and their employment in the public service, transfer of the administration of church taxes to the state tax offices and the involvement of employers in the collection of church taxes, the right of churches to determine the rate of assessment for the collection of church taxes, the establishment of free schools under church sponsorship and their funding.
Religious freedom
The central constitutional norm is Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Basic Law:
1) Freedom of faith, freedom of conscience and freedom of religious and philosophical belief are inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.
Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Basic Law guarantees the freedom of religion of every individual. Everyone is free to profess a religion and join a religious community. However, everyone is also free not to profess any religion, to leave a religious community or to change to another one.
Like all fundamental rights, this provision is primarily a right of defence against the state and possible encroachments on this freedom. However, in addition to the individual fundamental right, Article 4 also guarantees the corporate practice of religion. The freedom of religious confession is not limited to the freedom of the individual to make private and public confessions; its realisation also requires freedom of the church in its full sense - as clearly stated by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) (E 42,312(323)).
In this context, reference should also be made to the right to self-determination laid down in Art. 137 para. 3 WRV in conjunction with Art. 140 GG. Art. 140 of the Basic Law. As an institutional safeguard, this is not protected by
Art. 4 is obsolete, rather the clear interpretation including Art. 4 GG is confirmed. The church's right to self-determination encompasses the freedom of religious life and activity and the freedom to determine organisation, standard-setting and administration, which is indispensable for the performance of these tasks. In Germany, this right to self-determination within the church was legally undisputed for many decades. With the communitisation of many areas of law, e.g. in labour law, the influence of the EU courts has grown.
Neutrality requirement
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the state must be the "home of all citizens" - regardless of their religious or ideological beliefs. The state must therefore not identify itself with a particular religious or ideological denomination. Instead, it must be neutral and tolerant towards all religious and ideological communities.
The ban on state churches is explained by the historical background up to 1918: the monarchical sovereign also had the sovereign church regiment. But unlike in other states, the Weimar Constitution and the Basic Law did not provide for a strict separation of state and religion in the Federal Republic of Germany due to the incorporation of the regulations there. Co-operation between state and church was and is assumed!
I would like to emphasise this once again: The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany does not provide for a strict separation between state and religion in its so-called state-church law (or also: religious constitutional law). In addition to the clear ban on state churches, regulations on co-operation have also been adopted that existed in the Weimar Constitution: The continuation and guarantee of corporate status, Art. 137 para. 5, state benefits Art. 138 and co-operation in religious education in schools, and on other points.
Art. 137 para. 1 is not understood as an expression of state indifference, but as an expression of the state's religious and ideological neutrality. A prohibition of identification of the state with only one particular religious-ideological view. In the words of the Federal Constitutional Court: "The Basic Law imposes religious and ideological neutrality on the state as the home of all citizens, regardless of person. It prohibits the introduction of state-church legal forms and forbids the privileging of certain denominations." (BVerfGE 19,206(216)) This neutrality requirement is also not opposed by the regulations on corporate status in Art. 137 para. 5 and the rights associated with it.
Religious and ideological communities have the special status of a public corporation. With this status, the state grants special rights. The special rights granted to the communities include, for example, the right to collect taxes from their members, the ability to act as employers (possibility of structuring the legal status of their employees under public law), the power to legislate (for their own internal law, e.g. regulations on internal church organisation and the membership relationship) and the right to create ecclesiastical public property through dedication.
In addition, the legislator has linked a number of individual benefits to the corporate status of religious communities (the so-called bundle of privileges). These include, for example, favourable tax treatment or the granting of enforcement protection. In contrast, representation in public and state bodies (e.g. broadcasting councils), for example, is not always linked to corporate status. It often only takes place through the designation of the respective religious community as a socially relevant group. Many other rights are also not linked to corporate status. These include, for example, the operation of facilities such as kindergartens or retirement homes, the construction of buildings that serve religious purposes and access to religious education in accordance with Art. 7 para. 3 GG.
The status of a public corporation is not a prerequisite for a community to be able to appear as a religious community at all or to make use of the rights otherwise granted to religious communities.
Acquisition of corporate status
In accordance with Art. 140 GG in conjunction with. Art. 137 para. 5 sentence 1 WRV, those religious communities that are corporations under public law retain this status. This means that the legal status of the two major Christian churches and other so-called old-corporate religious communities that existed when the Weimar Constitution was enacted was retained.
Other religious communities are to be granted the same rights upon application. Corporate status is to be recognised if its constitution and the number of its members indicate that the religious community will continue to exist in the future. The basis for this assessment is the current membership of the religious community and its "constitution in other respects". However, the indicators used for this in state practice (such as a minimum period of existence) must not be applied schematically and disrupt the required overall assessment. In addition, no circumstances may be included in the assessment that the religiously and ideologically neutral state is not permitted to evaluate.
In its case law, the Federal Constitutional Court also requires the religious community to comply with the law (BVerfGE 102, 370 ff. - Jehovah's Witnesses). According to this, the religious community must exercise the sovereign power transferred to it in accordance with the constitutional and other legal obligations. It must guarantee that its future behaviour does not jeopardise the fundamental constitutional principles outlined in Art. 79 para. 3 GG. Likewise, it must not restrict the fundamental rights of third parties or the basic principles of liberal religious and state-church law of the Basic Law.
If the aforementioned requirements are met, the religious or philosophical community has a constitutional right to be granted the status of a public corporation.
Current legal and socio-political issues
State benefits Art. 138 para. 1 WRV
"(1) State payments to religious organisations based on law, treaty or special legal titles shall be replaced by state legislation. The principles for this shall be established by the Reich."
According to this, state benefits are only those financial contributions or tax exemptions that belong to the historically developed system of state-church relations. I.e. that accrued to the state from the period before 1919, primarily the compensation obligations established with the secularisation of church property by the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803. Secularisation was the result of the reorganisation of the empire: it was intended to "compensate" the secular princes for their loss of territory on the left bank of the Rhine to France. At the imperial level, the sovereign power of the spiritual imperial estates was abolished and all the land of the secularised imperial bishoprics and abbeys was added (annexed) to the territories of the secular princes. In return for the loss of around 2,700 square kilometres on the left bank of the Rhine, Prussia received "compensation" in the form of ecclesiastical land covering around 13,000 square kilometres. At the level of the individual states, the confiscation of landed church property was added.
The state benefits were thus created as a substitute for the church's own resources. They became legal claims when the church subsequently became independent from the state in terms of property law. The legal basis for the state benefits is therefore not the confiscation of church property itself, but rather the burdens to be borne by way of legal succession that rest on the confiscated church property on the one hand, and on the other hand the performance rights already established by the state at the time, which had to provide permanent compensation for the deprivation of the church's economic basis. Through Art. 138 para. 1 WRV and the novation of the state-church contract, the state benefits were detached from their historical origins and became independent.
The historically confusing portfolio of "state benefits based on law, contract or special legal titles", which the federal states owe to the Roman Catholic dioceses and the Protestant regional churches in their territory, have been summarised by mutual agreement in the state-church agreements between the federal states and the churches entitled to state benefits in lump-sum, indexed annual payments - the novations. Redemption is only permitted in return for compensation payments. In order for such a redemption to be possible, a basic federal law must be enacted. For a long time, the significance of this programme sentence from the Weimar Constitution was a purely academic question.
However, this issue was already discussed in the German Bundestag during the last legislative period and moved into the political spotlight! Corresponding bills were introduced by the then opposition parliamentary groups in the Bundestag, including the AfD parliamentary group and the DIE LINKE, Alliance 90/The Greens and FDP parliamentary groups (see Bundestag printed papers 19/19649 and 19/19273), but were rejected by the then governing majority, the GroKo, after a public hearing of the Committee for Home Affairs and Homeland Affairs with experts.
The replacement is now very much on the political agenda: the following wording has been included in the 2021 to 2025 coalition agreement concluded between the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens and the FDP:
"We are creating a fair framework for the replacement of state benefits in a basic law in dialogue with the federal states and the churches."
This is already being implemented: a working group has been set up consisting of employees from the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and for Home Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the federal states, churches and experts, which is to draw up key points from which a law is to be developed. The very ambitious timetable envisages that this law will be passed in 2024.
What order of magnitude are we talking about when we talk about state benefits? I am focussing here on the two large churches. Together they received € 602 million from the federal states (€ 355 million from the Protestant and € 248 million from the Catholic churches). It should be noted here that some federal states also grant state benefits to other churches/religious communities for reasons of equal treatment, totalling €688 million.
According to the Protestant Church, state contributions account for around 2.5 % of annual income. For the Catholic Church, this is likely to be slightly more. It should be noted that "redemption" means the cancellation of the obligation to provide permanent services in return for compensation. Art. 138 para. 1 WRV aims at a unilateral cancellation with the redemption "by the state legislation", without excluding a redemption by mutual agreement between the federal state obliged to provide state benefits and the church entitled to state benefits. The state benefit claims can only be cancelled in exchange for compensation. The cancellation must therefore be combined with compensation for their economic value.
In principle, the redemption payment must be based on full compensation. Some legal scholars are of the opinion that the redemption payment does not have to cover the value of the state benefit in full, but only "appropriately", whereby the extent of the reduction deemed permissible remains unclear. In politics, the argument goes even further: Payments since 1803 have meant that redemption has long since taken place. This overlooks the fact that if the property had remained in the hands of the churches, they would have been able to generate income from it in the long term or would have done so in the future.
Irrespective of this, the imponderables and political and financial costs of enforcing the law can provide reasons for seeking a pragmatic mutual concession in the event of a mutually agreed redemption. This pragmatism has its place and its framework in the uncertainties of any forecast about the future earning power of the redemption payment.
Both churches have expressed their willingness to engage in dialogue about this replacement. In my opinion, the Protestant Church more clearly than the Catholic Church, where the focus was more on dialogue than on the outcome. It remains to be seen how this process will ultimately turn out. In my opinion, however, legal and socio-political questions arise: Does this mandate from the Weimar Constitution and the Basic Law of 1949 still apply today? Has it been superseded by the passage of time? Or are these state benefits not to be assessed quite differently in the overall context of the allocation of welfare state funds and not under the historical "compensation payments"?
Is the order still valid? In formal legal terms: yes. Is there an unconditional obligation to implement it and why only now? Have all other governments violated the Basic Law by not implementing the mandate? In my opinion, no: there is no violation and if there is no implementation, this is not justiciable in my opinion.
Politically, the coalition agreement should also be consulted again. The overall text of the coalition agreement on churches and religious communities is worthy of note in this respect: "Churches and religious communities are an important part of our community and make a valuable contribution to coexistence and the communication of values in society. We value and respect their work. In dialogue with the federal states and the churches, we are creating a fair framework for the replacement of state contributions in a basic law. We are further developing religious constitutional law in line with the co-operative separation model and thus improving the participation and representation of religious communities, especially Muslim communities. To this end, we are examining whether amendments to the legal status of religious communities are necessary and are discussing this in close consultation with the affected churches and religious communities. We are involving newer, progressive Islamic communities based in Germany in this process. We are expanding the training programmes for imams at German universities in cooperation with the federal states."
In general, the signs are pointing to greater distance between the state and the churches - or, to put it more clearly, greater distance from the Christian churches. Religious constitutional law is to be further developed "in line with the co-operative separation model". The aim is to improve the participation and representation of Muslim communities in particular. "Newer, progressive Islamic communities that are at home in Germany" are to be integrated, and cooperation between religious communities and "places of encounter" are to be promoted. In general, the traffic light programme focuses more on supporting Muslim communities. The Christian churches in their importance for society and social cohesion are clearly not in the focus! I consider this to be very problematic in socio-political terms. This coalition is showing a great deal of commitment in another area and this with a justification that is contrary to this "further development of the separation requirement".
Here I refer to the Democracy Promotion Act. The aim of the Democracy Promotion Act is to provide reliable and needs-based funding for projects that promote democracy, strengthen social diversity and prevent extremism on the ground. With the Act, the federal government is placing the important work of the initiatives and projects "on a more stable and sustainable footing, and the existing and proven structures can be maintained and further developed", explained the responsible Family Minister Paus.
Until now, the federal government was only able to fund projects for a certain period of time because there was no legal basis for longer-term funding. The draft bill for the Democracy Promotion Act now creates a legal mandate for the federal government to promote and strengthen democracy and prevent all forms of extremism for the first time. This means that projects can also receive longer-term funding and have more planning security. This law is intended to create structures and ensure that they are maintained beyond the project period. Associations and organisations receive support for their organisation.
In the case of state benefits, the argument is the other way round: Why does the state support the organisation of the churches? It is precisely such organisational structures that are necessary in order to have an active impact on society. Just as an example: to support and help the many volunteers; to enable them to actually provide their material help. I refer only to the refugee crisis: the work of the volunteers was possible because there was a "back-up" provided by the church organisations. Here I refer to what I said earlier: shouldn't these state benefits be assessed quite differently in the overall context of welfare state funding and not under the historical "compensation payments"?
Would it not be appropriate to talk about a different heading here and "replace" these benefits and transfer them to a different form? In my opinion, the state should be just as interested in preserving the tried and tested structures of the major Christian churches and strengthening them for the cohesion of our society as it is with the other structures mentioned in the Democracy Promotion Act.
I cannot answer whether this is still politically feasible and possible. Realistically, however, the chances of this happening must be considered very slim. As the "old" replacement is obviously also a political symbol for the coalition partners - and symbols are important!
Religious symbols in society
This brings me from a political symbol to the use of religious symbols in society and in public. Here, I would like to focus on two symbols that are a constant source of discussion - for a variety of reasons: the cross and the headscarf.
In terms of constitutional law, the issues in this regard are categorised under the heading of freedom of religion. Both under the positive freedom of religion and under the negative freedom of religion. I will start historically with the cross and here with the crucifix decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1995. The decision of the First Senate of 16 May 1995 - 1 BvR 1087/91 - in its first guiding principle reads: "1. The placement of a cross or crucifix in the classrooms of a state compulsory school that is not a denominational school violates Article 4 (1) of the Basic Law."
At the time, this decision by the Federal Constitutional Court led to heated discussions not only in the legal community, but especially in the general political public. To anticipate, I consider this decision to be correct against the background of the state's duty of neutrality, which is clearly stipulated in the Basic Law. Therefore, whenever the state acts externally, it must be examined whether the use of religious symbols still sufficiently fulfils this neutrality requirement. Not only is knowledge taught at school, pupils are also supposed to be "educated" in many areas. It is assumed that pupils are still "malleable", that they absorb and implement many things. In this respect, it is important to educate in a "neutral" way. There used to be the term "special relationship of violence" for schools. In such a "relationship of subjugation", it is all the more important to be neutral. The same applies to other areas in which the state acts as a sovereign towards citizens. Police and justice, for example!
The crucifix decision by the Federal Constitutional Court has remained largely without practical consequences to date. According to the Bavarian government, the cross in the classroom is to remain the rule. Only in special, justified "atypical exceptional cases" is it to be taken down in response to individual complaints. After § 13 para. 1 sentence 3 of the school regulations for primary schools in Bavaria was declared null and void, the following sentence 1 was added to Art. 7 para. 4 of the Bavarian Education and Teaching Act on 23 December 1995: "In view of the historical and cultural character of Bavaria, a cross shall be displayed in every classroom."
A decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also goes in this direction: In the decision of the ECtHR of 3 November 2009, Italy was ordered to pay compensation to an applicant because crucifixes had not been removed from her children's school. This ruling was overturned by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR on 18 March 2011, as the installation of the crucifix did not constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Crosses in classrooms do not violate freedom of religion. It could not be proven that a crucifix on the wall had an influence on the pupils, even if it was primarily a religious symbol.
I had explained that the neutrality requirement comes into play particularly when the state acts in a sovereign capacity towards its citizens. In my opinion, however, two current cases are to be judged completely differently: The hanging of a crucifix in Münster at the G7 summit in a conference room and the endeavours of our Minister of State for Culture to remove the cross on the Berlin Palace and the historical inscription on the dome there. This action or intended action is clearly not required by the neutrality requirement! There is no interference with the religious freedom of others! Rather, this is a distancing from Christian symbols and the values associated with them. The Christian cross is thus denied the right to be a symbol of tolerance, charity and the freedom of the individual. It is reduced to the undeniably historical history of proselytising by both Christian religions combined with cruelty towards those being proselytised.
We have to face up to the historical facts, but the necessary discussion will not be opened up if history is kept out of the public eye. This becomes particularly clear in Münster: the peace treaty after the Thirty Years' War was negotiated in the Peace Hall. A war between two parties who both fought under the cross and for the cross.
About the palace or Humboldt Forum: In 2003, the German Bundestag decided to rebuild the palace in its historical form with the cross, dome and dome inscription.
Here too, despite all the negative aspects associated with this lock, it is important to face up to these questions and not simply banish them from the public sphere. Then there will be no open discussion; instead, only one, supposedly "politically correct" interpretation will be given. I would like to refer once again to what I said about the state lines. A new understanding of the principle of separation becomes clear here: not just separation and neutrality, but rather distancing and greater distance from the Christian religion and its symbols!
The exact opposite is true for some political actors with the headscarf!
This brings me to the so-called headscarf controversy. I ask for your understanding if I do not deal with or even answer the complex questions such as the voluntary and/or religious obligation to wear a headscarf. For the other questions, I assume that a Muslim woman who wants to wear a headscarf as a civil servant does so voluntarily and as an expression of her religious position.
But that already answers one question. It is an expression of religious conviction, an active display of religious beliefs and not a fashionable item of clothing. In my opinion, this already answers the question of permissibility: Just like the offensive wearing or display of Christian or Jewish symbols as a representative of a state committed to neutrality, the headscarf is also not permissible.
This is currently once again the subject of political discussion at state level in Berlin against the backdrop of a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court. The court has not accepted the constitutional complaint lodged by the state of Berlin against a ruling by the Federal Labour Court. This judgement is therefore legally binding. It deals with the so-called Berlin Neutrality Act.
The law stipulates that people in public service in Berlin, such as police officers, court employees, judges, public prosecutors and teachers, are not allowed to wear religious or ideological symbols or clothing while on duty. Jewish men are therefore not allowed to wear kippahs, Muslim women are not allowed to wear headscarves, and visible necklaces with crosses are also not permitted.
The Federal Labour Court awarded damages to a female teacher who was refused employment because she only wanted to teach with a headscarf.
This law must now be amended. Political views on the amendment of the law differ widely! Some actors in state politics are celebrating this decision as a "victory" for religious freedom for Muslims. I wonder whether this would also be the case in a legal dispute over a Christian symbol. Just think of the cross on the Humboldt Forum. If the headscarf is authorised, then it can only be a release of all religious symbols. In my opinion, the necessary solution would be an amendment to the law in which the reasons for the conflicts associated with the wearing of the headscarf and the conflicts to be avoided are given. This would fulfil the neutrality requirement of the state and its representatives.
I am clearly of the opinion that the ban on wearing or displaying religious symbols should continue to apply to everyone. In situations where a representative of the state is in contact with citizens and there is a possibility of influence or conflict, religious symbols are still prohibited. Where an employee has no contact with citizens, the wearing of religious symbols is also unproblematic.
The following four theses are intended to summarise what has been said:
1. neutrality of the state "Yes". This also applies to the display and wearing of religious symbols by state employees when they are in contact with citizens and especially when they are acting in a sovereign capacity.
2. no weakening of the churches by state or political actors. We also need religious institutions for the cohesion of our society.
3. a clear "yes" to dialogue with the Islamic associations, but also critically addressing the links with foreign (state) organisations and not adopting certain narratives of these associations.
4 Religion can be a source of support and help, especially in times of crisis. The two major Christian churches should therefore see this current situation as an opportunity and, as institutions, turn their attention back to people and their real problems. 
As this is a lecture manuscript, detailed references and footnotes have been deliberately omitted. The figures on religious communities are taken from publications by fowid (Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland) and a study by the Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees from 2020. All assessments and evaluations reflect the personal opinion of the speaker.
